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Abstract
In November of 2021, The Russian Federation conducted an anti-satellite test (ASAT),
destroying one of their defunct satellites in low earth orbit (LEO). This test, although not the first
of its kind, created thousands of pieces of new space debris, threatening LEO satellites and the
International Space Station (ISS). Russia’s test has resurfaced discussions on the militarization of
space and its long-term sustainability. Absent legally binding multilateral agreements aimed at
long-term peace and sustainability in space, the area will continue to develop in a hazardous
direction. Therefore, The United States should initiate a multilateral treaty to develop a partial
ban on ASAT tests. Part of this initiative should include transparency and confidence-building
measures focused on space situational awareness (SSA).
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Introduction
The new and perplexing challenges in the outer space domain have outgrown the
framework that nation-states have used to address them. Due to the expansion and development
of technology, the space environment has become congested and threatening, if not hostile. To
preserve the domain for future use, the United States must take a leadership role in developing
new international norms for space. Anti-satellite weapons are at the crux of the domain’s security
and sustainability issue. Therefore, the United States should propose a partial ASAT test ban and
initiate confidence-building measures to secure the outer space environment for long-term use.
The Space Race
In October 1957, the Soviet Union launched their first satellite, Sputnik I, into space. The
Soviet’s satellite prompted the United States to develop its own capabilities in space, leading to
the famous “space race.” The United States launched its first satellite into orbit, Explorer 1, in
January of 1958.1 More shockingly, in April of 1961 Russian cosmonaut, Yuri Gagarin became
the first man in outer space. Following this Soviet accomplishment, it seemed as if the Soviet
Union had won the space race. Yet, in July of 1969, the most profound development of space
exploration would occur. American astronauts Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin became the first
men to step foot on the moon.2 On that day, Armstrong famously stated “That’s one small step
for man, one giant leap for mankind.” With these words, the “space race” would transition into a
new era: an era of scientific discovery, but more importantly one of strategic development.
The advancements in space technology during the space race placed science and prestige at the
forefront of the nation’s psyche.3 After the launch of Sputnik I, the development of
reconnaissance satellites increased dramatically. Reconnaissance satellites, also known as spy
satellites, can collect imaging data as they orbit above another nation’s territory. These satellites
provide valuable intelligence previously impossible to gather without flying over another
nation’s territory, which would be a breach of sovereignty. The strategic value of reconnaissance
satellites spurred the development of counter-space measures, such as antisatellite weapons.4
The United States conducted the first anti-satellite weapons test in 1959 under project
Bold Orion. The missile was aimed to intercept the U.S. satellite, Explorer VI. Flight data
revealed that the objectives of the mission were met, and the United States had just conducted
the first successful ASAT test.5 The United States' development of an anti-satellite system was
explicitly designed for the inspection of orbiting satellites. To execute the inspection, the vehicle
would situate itself within 50 feet of the satellite to be inspected.6 This program was later
canceled by the United States not only because of its expense but the risk of creating an
international incident. In 1968 the Soviet Union began to test their first ASAT system, a satellite
National Archives, “Space Exploration: timeline,” Archives Library Information Center, last modified
August 21, 2016, https://www.archives.gov/research/alic/reference/space-timeline.html
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3
interceptor. The initial test was successful, and the Soviets continued to develop their ASAT
programs throughout the 1970s. Through multiple antisatellite tests during this period, the
Soviets demonstrated their ability to intercept and destroy satellites.
At the beginning of the 1980s, the Reagan administration prioritized the continued
development of the U.S. ASAT program.7 The U.S. pursued a strategy of deterrence in space.
The administration believed that an operational U.S. ASAT program would deter the Soviet’s
use of their weapons system. In 1981 The Soviet Union brought an arms control proposal called
the “Draft Treaty on the Prohibition of the Stationing of Weapons of Any Kind in Outer Space”
to the UN General Assembly. The proposal was focused on the placement of orbiting weapons in
outer space but did not prohibit ASAT systems.8 Although it prohibited the destruction of or
disturbance of another states’ space systems, the United States rejected the proposal. The Soviets
submitted another draft of the proposed treaty in 1983. The draft included major developments
including a complete ASAT test ban and a provision that required the destruction of current
ASAT systems, including the Soviet’s interceptor system. The United States denied the treaty
because it was unverifiable and lacked provisions for attribution in the event of an attack.9 After
failing to ratify the agreement, both nations continued to develop their counter-space capabilities.
Although since the 1980s, there have been significant advancements in technology, little
progress has been made on the creation of norms in outer space. Yet, the environment has grown
increasingly congested and contentious due to space debris and the proliferation of weapons
systems.
Examining the Problem
The future preservation of the space domain is a multifaceted dilemma, yet the most
pressing issues are the security and sustainability of the environment. Both security and
sustainability are interconnected. Neither can exist independently, thus both are equally vital to
the preservation of space for future generations. In the present context, security in space refers to
a state’s military interests. Sustainability refers to the preservation of the environment for longterm use. Unlike during the Cold War period, more nations and private companies are utilizing
space. The increased access and use of space have contributed to the congested environment,
threatening its sustainability. Further, global powers such as the United States depend on space
systems to conduct virtually all military operations. Therefore, the increasing levels of debris and
the militarization of the environment are risks to space security. Anti-satellite weapons and their
destructive testing are issues that intersect both space security and sustainability. These weapons
threaten a nation’s space security because they are a form of asymmetric warfare. Anti-satellite
systems can be used to destroy a state’s critical security systems such as satellites used for
military communications or early-warning satellites. Some forms of ASAT testing create large
debris fields contributing to the congestion of the domain and threatening its sustainability. The
existence and testing of ASAT weapons are areas that must be addressed to protect the stability
and sustainability of space. Currently, there are limited international guidelines that regulate
activities in space and functionally none that regulate anti-satellite capabilities. This must be
addressed if space is to remain secure and sustainable.
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Space Security
Due to the proliferation of space weapons, the security of the space domain is at risk. The
United States has a strong interest in the protection of space satellites. From communication
systems to intelligence gathering and early warning satellites, space is a strategic domain. The
value of these space-based systems has caused the proliferation of technology, such as ASAT
weapons, designed to protect against an attack on critical national security infrastructure.10
Recently, testing of such weapons has significantly increased; “Since 2005, there have been 20
ASAT weapons tests in space or against satellites by four different countries, a rate of testing
that has not happened since the 1960s.”11 The United States' current strategy in space security, is
deterrence. Thus, U.S. leadership has not pursued legally binding arms control agreements,
which could restrict this strategy. As other space-faring nations begin to develop capabilities
aimed at the destruction of U.S. military capacity, it may be necessary to pursue a fair and
equitable agreement.
The United States’ greatest strategic threats in space are Russia and China. Russia is the
apparent competitor, with a long history of U.S. competition and cooperation. Though the
relationship on the ground can be tense and adversarial, in space, the accord has been largely
cooperative. For example, the close cooperation on the International Space Stations (ISS), and
the use of Russian rockets. Yet, the cooperative spirit in space relations does not negate Russia’s
strategic capabilities. More recently, China has developed a strong presence in space and has
developed counter-space capabilities.12 China’s continued development of strategic capabilities
will become a challenge for the United States. The Chinese are developing various counter space
capabilities ranging from on-orbit systems, ground-based ASAT weapons, and cyberspace
systems.13 They have not been transparent with these technological developments, which
suggests they are building up covert weapons systems. For example, Tianjin University, has
developed a space robot supposedly intended to attach to space debris to remove it from orbit.
However, its design would make it difficult to attach to debris. The targeted debris “would likely
need to be in a predictable motion in an established orbit in order for capture by the robotic arm
to be possible. The design of this satellite lends itself to a co-orbital ASAT, even if that is not the
stated intent.”14 Space weapons have already been developed, and there is no going back. The
question thus becomes, what is the best way to mitigate their negative effects?
In a testimony before the House Science, Space, and Technology Committee, Todd
Harrison, director for the Aerospace Security Project at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies stated that “the real objective of this [new space] race is to see who can build the
Victoria Samson and Brian Weeden, “Enhancing Space Security: Time for Legally Binding Measures,” Arms
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broadest and strongest international coalition in space. Whatever group of nations emerges as the
leading coalition in space over the next decade will be the ones that set the de facto norms for the
space commerce and exploration that follows.”15 The United States must continue to lead in the
space environment, by introducing equitable norms which align with U.S. national security and
commercial interests. Although the United States faces formidable competition from Russia and
China, cooperation is still possible. One example Harrison cites is the cooperation that took place
between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.16 Cooperation and
increased transparency between the two nations created a framework for future dialogue. The
same can be true in the increasingly militarized space environment.
Space Sustainability
The sustainability of the space environment is critical to its long-term use for peaceful
purposes. Currently, the greatest threat to sustainability is the growing volume of space debris.
Much of modern technology relies on space-based satellites. Thus, Low Earth Orbit (LEO), has
become congested with new space objects and continues to worsen. New orbital debris is created
in various ways, including satellite collisions, launching debris, and ASAT weapons tests.
Concern over the increase in space debris in LEO is often articulated using the “Kessler
Syndrome,” which explains the impact of continued in-orbit collisions. The theory predicts that
in a congested orbit space debris will collide and produce more debris. New debris will continue
to collide at higher velocities creating a cascade of collisions. Ultimately, the orbit will become
too crowded and unusable.17 Kessler cites three different types of collisions: negligible noncatastrophic, non-catastrophic, and catastrophic.18 The first two types of collisions do not create
large debris fields and at worst impact the environment in the short term.19 A catastrophic
collision impacts both the short-term and long-term sustainability of the environment. This
collision produces small and large fragments. The large fragments impact the long-term
suitability of space through collision cascades. Data suggests that any fragments 20cm or larger
colliding with an intact space object would result in a catastrophic collision.20 Generally, antisatellite tests are examples of catastrophic collisions. Thus, the debris created from a single test
may continue to produce more debris after the initial collision.
Although the United States, China, and India have all conducted debris-creating ASAT
tests, Russia’s most recent test has drawn international criticism. On November 15, 2021, Russia
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tested a direct ascent ASAT missile hitting their defunct COSMOS 1408 satellite.21 The United
States has reported that their test created at least 1,500 fragments of trackable debris (at least
10cm in diameter), with many smaller fragments.22 The test forced astronauts at the ISS to
undergo safety procedures in the event of a collision. In a press release Bill Nelson, NASA
administrator, condemned the Russian’s action stating, “It is unthinkable that Russia would
endanger not only the American and international partner astronauts on the ISS but also their
cosmonauts. Their actions are reckless and dangerous… all nations have a responsibility to
prevent the purposeful creation of space debris from ASATs and to foster a safe, sustainable
space environment.”23 Nelson calls for all nations to refrain from conducting debris-creating
ASAT tests, yet there is no international legally binding framework to prevent such actions, this
must change.
The current international perspective on intentional debris creation is evidenced through
non-legally binding agreements. First is the 2010 Debris Mitigation Guidelines established by
the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. The guidelines primarily address
debris mitigation for the construction, orbiting, and de-orbiting of satellites. In addition to these
measures, Guideline 4 states that the “intentional destruction of any on-orbit spacecraft and
launch vehicle orbital stages or other harmful activities which generate long-lived debris should
be avoided.”24 Russia is a signatory of this agreement yet did not honor its provisions. Further,
Russia did not honor its submission of space norms to be included in the U.N. Resolution
“Reducing Space Threats Through Norms, Rules, and Principles of Responsible Behavior.” This
resolution, adopted in December of 2020, asked states to submit suggestions for responsible
norms in outer space. Russia suggested that states should “not construct, test or deploy space
weapons, regardless of where they are based, for any purpose, including for missile defense or as
anti-satellite capabilities.”25 Russia’s actions have proven that voluntary norms will not suffice to
prevent reckless weapons testing, rather legally binding norms are necessary.
Lack of Norms and Regulation
The primary governing law related to the use of outer space is the multilateral Treaty on
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. More commonly referred to as the Outer Space
Treaty (OST), which was adopted in the UN General Assembly in 1967. The treaty recognizes
the “interest of all mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful
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purposes.”26 This purpose statement reflects the interest of all states to preserve the security and
sustainability of the environment. Further, the treaty stipulates that “States Parties to the Treaty
undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any
other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station
such weapons in outer space in any other manner.”27 The OST only makes provisions against
nuclear weapons and does not prohibit the use of other weapons such as anti-satellite systems.
The most recent attempt at a legally binding arms control agreement was jointly proposed
by Russia and China in 2008. Their proposal, which was later revised and resubmitted in 2014,
was the Prevention of Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat of Use of Force against
Outer Space Objects (PPWT). The purpose of the treaty was articulated as, “desiring to prevent
outer space turning into a new area of weapons placement or an arena for military confrontation
and thereby to avert a grave danger to international peace and security.”28 The draft prohibits the
placement of any weapons in outer space.29 Under the treaty, a “weapon in outer space” is
defined as “any outer space object or component thereof which has been produced or converted
to destroy, damage or disrupt the normal functioning of objects in outer space.”30 In addition, the
draft emphasizes the implementation of transparency and confidence-building measures
(TCBMs).31 It suggests that nations should “develop procedures for collective data sharing and
information analysis.”32 The United States did not sign either version presented in 2008 or 2014
because there was not a verification protocol. The PPWT simply suggests the need for potential
“additional protocol” to verify treaty compliance.33 In addition, the proposal does not address the
use of terrestrially based ASAT weapons. This was another major concern for the U.S. and its
allies. The PPWT is important to the discussion of space arms control for two reasons. First, it
was proposed by Russia and China. Although it was largely a political strategy to make the U.S.
look bad for developing space weapons, it demonstrates an openness to a legally binding arms
control agreement.34 Secondly, it reveals gaps in the treaty which must be shorn up before a
similar treaty could be ratified.
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Risks of Current U.S. Strategy
First, on the issue of space security, policymakers have been hesitant to pursue any
agreement which would undermine the United States’ freedom to pursue specific activities in
space. This presupposes that the United States is ahead of its competitors in spacefaring
capabilities. The increasing competition from Russia and China in space should change the
United States’ calculus.35 The proliferation of space weapons and increased technological
capabilities demonstrate that the United States’ strategic edge in space is waning. Thus, it is time
for the United States to consider a legally binding agreement.36 Next, on the issue of
sustainability, destructive ASAT tests have and will continue to contribute to a congested LEO.
An overcrowded space environment increases the likelihood of collision cascades and the
potential of a miscalculation. Ultimately, this reduces the long-term sustainability of the domain
and should be a considerable concern for the United States.
Paths Forward for U.S. Space Policy
The future of U.S. space policy could move forward in multiple directions. First, is the
status quo strategy of deterrence. The Biden administration’s space policy aims “to deter
aggression against the U.S., allied, and partner interests in a manner that contributes to strategic
stability, the United States will accelerate its transition to a more resilient national security space
posture and strengthen its ability to detect and attribute hostile acts in space.”37 The U.S. can
continue to meet these goals through improvements in technological resiliency. To address
current challenges, the Space Force is updating and enhancing existing GPS satellites with antijamming software.38 In addition, they are creating many smaller satellites, more difficult to
destroy, and placing less value in each target. This is a strong strategy to increase the resiliency
of U.S. systems.39 These actions will continue to bolster U.S. deterrence and is a viable path for
future space operations.
Second, the United States could pursue an alternative strategy to deterrence by engaging
in talks for a limited legally binding option. A partial ASAT test ban and increased TCBM’s
would be the first step to comprehensive norms for outer space. The agreement would ban debris
causing ASAT tests and involve TCBM’s on debris tracking and non-sensitive space situational
awareness information (SSA). The TCBM’s should also include discussion on rules of
engagement, and responsible norms in space.40 This double-layered approach would mitigate
some sustainability issues arising from space debris, and it would build confidence in legally
binding measures to eventually bolster space security.
Lastly, the United States could pursue a more comprehensive legally binding arms
control agreement. This would be similar to the PPWT proposed by Russia and China. For an
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agreement to be successful it must adequately address treaty verification. It must address
verification and ground-based ASAT systems. Although challenging, verification is not
impossible. Debris creating collisions or a close approach by another nation’s satellite can be
verified.41 Further, the United States and Canada have tested systems that would allow in-orbit
inspection of a satellite. These systems contain sensors that can inspect an object in orbit. This
tactic analyzes the form of the inspected object; therefore, it assumes that the form is built for its
function.42 The technology could be utilized to verify the function of other states’ satellites. It
would be the space equivalent to on-site inspection of nuclear facilities.43 To address concerns on
ground-based ASAT systems, the treaty would include limits on how many weapons could be
developed. This aligns with aggregate limits placed on nuclear warheads and ICBMs under the
New START treaty.44
Criteria for Analysis: Viability, Benefit, Equity
To determine the best policy path for the United States, it is important to identify criteria
for analysis. The three criteria that will be used to analyze the policy alternatives are viability,
benefit, and equity. Viability is the likelihood that the policy could be successfully implemented.
This includes the probability that other states would agree to the policy. The second criterion,
benefit, is the projected success of the policy to solve the problem. In this case, the ability of the
policy to improve both the stability and sustainability of the space domain. Lastly, equity refers
to the fairness of a policy both to the United States and other nations operating in space.
Projected Outcomes and Tradeoffs
The first policy option for the U.S. is the status quo deterrence. This is a viable option for
the United States. It does not require participation from other states; therefore, consensus and
quick decision-making are benefits to this policy. The focus is U.S. strategic benefit. This may
bolster U.S. strategic interests in the short term by enhancing technological resilience, but it will
not be successful as a long-term strategy. If other spacefaring nations pursue deterrence the
domain will continue to militarize. This increases the probability of negative consequences such
as a miscalculation. Lastly, deterrence is an equitable option for the United States because it
enhances U.S. national security interests and does not concede ground to other states’ objectives.
In the short term, this policy may preserve the somewhat stable space environment, yet it
is passive stability that will not produce long-term benefits. In a hearing before the U.S. Senate
Armed Services Committee, Senator Fisher asked Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space
Policy, Mr. John Hill, if a defense-only approach will be successful in the space domain. Mr. Hill
stated that “defense is one piece of mission assurance, but it is better to start off with architecture
and do not require so much defense in the first place. What we face today is the legacy of having
designed architectures in an era when we did not face the kinds of threats we face today and
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10
transitioning to a new era.”45 Mr. Hill’s statement demonstrates that a short-term policy solely
focused on deterrence does not address more substantial, long-term issues. Thus, deterrence is a
short-term strategy that trades off with long-term security and sustainability.
The second policy option for the United States is a ban on debris causing ASAT tests and
an increase in TCBMs on SSA and data sharing. To determine if this path is viable, it is
important to analyze the space policy of the most dominant space powers, the U.S., Russia, and
China. First, the United States would support a partial test ban because it does not hurt strategic
interests, it simply bans dangerous, debris-causing explosions. The current U.S. policy affirms
that the U.S. will “demonstrate leadership in both the responsible use of space and stewardship
of the space environment.”46 It also affirms that “the United States will engage diplomatically
with strategic competitors in order to enhance stability in outer space.”47 Proposing an agreement
that prevents the creation of new debris is a leadership action that would improve space stability.
The U.S. has also previously participated in TCBMs, thus they will likely be open to them in the
future. China, as a growing space power has expressed its willingness to participate in the
creation of international norms. In a recent white paper published by the Chinese, they affirmed
their commitment to form international norms and ensure the long-term sustainability of space.48
Lastly, on paper Russia affirms its commitment to space sustainability, but its recent actions
demonstrate otherwise. Russia may be willing to ratify a binding treaty if it is articulated as a
precursor to a more comprehensive arms control agreement.
A partial ASAT test ban and increased transparency measures would be effective to
bolster the security and sustainability of space. It is effective at increasing suitability by
preventing deliberate human debris creation currently contributing to the issue. Greater SSA
sharing will prevent accidental collisions, hence reducing more preventable debris creation. The
TCBMs in this policy are key because they produce trust and provide a framework for future
cooperation. Data sharing and communication are key to the verification of actions in space.
Therefore, this aspect of the policy may be a necessary first step before there could be a more
comprehensive space arms control agreement. Lastly, the policy is relatively equitable. The
debris-producing test ban applies to all nations equally. It is plausible that the data sharing
involved in the TCBMs would not take place equally among signatories of the treaty. Either due
to lack of ability or lack of transparency. Yet generally this policy would be a beneficial first step
toward concrete norms in space.
Lastly, is the more comprehensive space arms control agreement. The viability of this
option is low, because of the serious concerns expressed by the United States and its allies.
Although there may be some ability to verify actions in space, the United States does not
consider current technology to be sufficient to verify treaty compliance. Further, if the issues of
verification and ground-based ASAT systems could be addressed in a revised PPWT there is no
assurance that Russia and China would still support the agreement. As to the benefit of the
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policy, this option would be the most comprehensive in addressing the security challenges of
space. In theory, it would prevent the continued militarization of the domain and address some
sustainability concerns. Yet these benefits would only exist if there was complete compliance by
all parties. Without a strong verification mechanism, there is no way to assure the treaty is
applied equally to all parties. Thus, this presents an interesting tradeoff. The policy could
significantly reduce space militarization, but there is a risk that other parties do not comply.
Therefore, the tradeoff would be a significant loss of U.S. dominance in space.
General Recommendations
The United States must pursue a policy that both benefits strategic interests and one that
preserves the space environment for long-term use. A partial ASAT test ban and an increase in
TCBMs satisfy both goals. The United States’ proposal of a partial ASAT test ban will
demonstrate leadership in space sustainability. Further, it prevents purposeful debris creation,
thus protecting the space domain for U.S. military and commercial assets. The policy mitigates
sustainability issues, but it does not hurt the U.S. strategic interests in space.
In addition to the partial ASAT test ban, the focus on TCBMs is critical to space
sustainability and future arms control measures. Data sharing increases capacity for conjunction
assessment, allowing satellite operators to maneuver to prevent accidental collisions and debris
creation. Currently, the United States operates the largest surveillance system known as the
Space Surveillance Network. It currently tracks over 21,000 objects which are at least 10 cm in
diameter. Russia currently has a similar system, with a smaller catalog.49 At the moment, there is
no streamlined way to share collision information, especially with U.S. competitors. Because
there is no streamlined mechanism, Russia and China do not easily engage with the United States
on basic data-sharing. To contact satellite operators from Russia or China, it must be done
through diplomatic channels. For example, communication through defense attachés.50 The goal
is to easily communicate data which is key for safety and flight operations. This data sharing
would not involve strategic information, rather data which pertains to safety operations.51
Lastly, increased data sharing is a first step to preventing the continued militarization of
space. Data sharing and better SSA are crucial to the development of a verification regime, to be
used in a future arms control agreement. Sharing of SSA information could eventually be used to
create a surveillance system with the capacity to track and catalog the orbital measurements of
satellites. This system could differentiate between an ASAT attack or an accidental collision.52
Thus, TCBMs mitigate debris creation, but also increase the probability of developing a
verification mechanism crucial for future norms in the domain. Russia and China, with their goal
of a comprehensive arms control agreement, should accept the proposed treaty as a necessary
first step.
Conclusion
To secure the space environment for future use, the United States must take a leadership
role in the development of new international norms. The current U.S. deterrence strategy will not
benefit the long-term security and sustainability of the environment. It only encourages other
nations to proliferate counter-space capabilities. The opposite of the current U.S. strategy is a
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comprehensive space arms control agreement like the PPWT proposed by Russia and China.
The lack of a verification mechanism means that this policy is not viable and could not be
implemented equitably to all state parties. The United States should pursue a mediated approach
through a partial ASAT test ban and increased TCBMs that emphasize SSA data sharing. This
path aligns with the space policy of most critical spacefaring nations; hence it is a viable option.
Further, it benefits the security and sustainability of space by providing a framework for a
verification mechanism that could be used for a future arms control agreement. Lastly, debris
causing ASAT attacks and tests are highly attributable because current technology is sufficient to
determine which state deployed an ASAT weapon. Attribution is critical because it means the
treaty could be equally applied to all signatories. These measures are key to the preservation of
the space environment and peaceful relationship-building among nations.
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